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CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE: A MODERN
REGULATORY TOOL
FRANCIS X. WELCHt
Introduction
T HE RECENT REPORT of the Administrative Conference' con-tains some thirty recommendations for making the regulatory
agencies of the United States government function more effectively.
Special stress was placed on proposals to simplify and speed up the
handling of matters pending before these agencies and, in support of
this, it was noted that during the fiscal year 1960 alone "approximately
80,140 formal proceedings for the determination of private rights and
obligations had been commenced before more than 100 boards, com-
missions, and other agencies of the government." 2
In the field of more or less conventional regulation s of interstate
public utility operations, as distinguished from various other forms of
regulation exercised by numerous other federal agencies, emphasis was
also placed upon the delay in rate making. Recommendations to remedy
these faults4 include the following: (1) requiring rate applicants to
support each rate filing with detailed data justifying the rate; (2)
developing standardized data relating to costs or other matters which
would be admissible; (3) attempting by rule making or policy state-
ments to formulate specific standards or principles to be applied in rate
cases; and (4) encouragement of negotiated settlements. The confer-
ence also recommends the elimination of "hearing by interludes" in
favor of a continuous uninterrupted proceeding. Generally the recom-
t Editor, Public Utilities Fortnightly, Washington, D.C.; Professor of Public
Utility Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 1962-63; LL.B., 1926, LL.M.,
1927, Georgetown University.
1. Final Report of the Administrative Conference of the United States, sent
to President Kennedy by the chairman of the conference, former Chief Justice E.
Barrett Prettyman of the United States Court of Appeals for the' District of
Columbia circuit, December 15, 1962. The conference was established by Executive
Order No. 10934, April 13, 1961.
2. Id. at 25.
3. The reference here is to the jurisdiction of such federal agencies as that of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (over railroads and motor carriers), the
Federal Power Commission (over gas and electric utilities), the Federal Com-
munications Commission (over interstate telephone, telegraph, and other communi-
cations carriers), the Civil Aeronautics Board (over commercial airlines), and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (over public utility holding companies and
their affiliates).
4. See n. 1, supra, Recommendation No. 19.
(340)
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CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE
mendations urge the reduction of the scope of rate proceedings and
shortening of their duration.
There is little quarrel with these four propositions as worthy gen-
eral objectives. Yet, upon careful reading, it is apparent that the first
and second items, above, relate to the development of data and evidence
to support the alternatives proposed in the third and fourth items.
These alternatives are: the disposal of specific cases according to pre-
ordained rules of policy and the settlement of such cases by less formal
negotiation.
In other words, if the staggering case load of these regulatory
tribunals is to be shaped to manageable proportions, obviously cases
will have to be restricted to those properly prepared and supported, and
the best way to do this is by rule making. On the other hand, if the
mechanics of informal settlement and negotiation are to be encouraged,
the best way to go about it is to foster a system of routine reporting
and disclosure by regulated utilities which will amount to a continuous
surveillance conducive to give-and-take agreements on a narrowed
range of factual differences.
These alternatives are in no sense competitive or conflicting. But
they are alternatives. They are different paths to the same end - the
disposition of the regulatory case load in an effective manner compatible
with the overall public interest. But which path is to be preferred under
given circumstances of a particular case, or class of cases, is a funda-
mental problem which confronts these regulatory commissions - as
the case loads mount to such fabulous proportions that the traditional
case-by-case approach falls further and further behind the avalanche of
new filings. In addition there is the pressure of other and relatively
more important policy making and administrative duties of these
commissions, which were never intended to function solely as regula-
tory courts grinding out specific decisions in the same manner as
courts of law.
This is also a problem of increasing urgency in the regulatory
field. It amounts to a balancing of the requirements for disposition of
specific cases under the traditional hearings-findings-and-decisions ap-
proach, as compared with a continuous form of a determination based
on a regulatory policy of general and constant inspection.
There is more to this than the old dichotomy tritely labeled by the
semantic tags of "rule making" and "adjudication," used to describe
the total regulatory process." The increasing urgency for balancing a
5. Dr. Mark S. Massel, senior staff member, The Brookings Institution, in
THE REGULATORY PROCESS, 1961, page 1, complains that these time-worn alternatives
completely overlook "the important processes of policy formulation, negotiation,
and administration."
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regulatory agency's indulgence in erratic full-dress adversary-type pro-
ceeding, as against less formal but regular determinations of regulated
industry performance in the public interest, stems from the plain fact
that our dynamic public utility industries are becoming more and more
complex and expanded. Trying to "fix" such operations (as of a date
certain) in terms of property investment, allowable expenses and earn-
ings, etc., through formal proceedings with all the accouterments of
general notice and publicity, proper pleadings, intervening and pro-
testing parties, hearings based on examination and cross-examination
by counsel, specific findings, and ultimate decisions becomes more and
more like trying to take a precise picture of something that simply will
not stand still.
Formal versus Informal Regulation
Informal regulation, or "regulation by negotiation" as it is some-
times called, had a relatively early start in the United States and for a
good reason. The reason was the increasing delay, expense, and diffi-
culty of major formal contested rate proceedings which invariably
found their way into the appellate courts. Because of the complexity
of these matters, and the frequent necessity for the appellate courts to
remand them to the commission for further findings or supplemental
action, it was not uncommon during the earlier years of commission
regulation for these cases to be shuttled back and forth for a decade
or more. I.
Writing twenty-five years ago in favor of interim or temporary
rate making (as a sort of time-saving alternative to formal rate mak-
ing), the present chairman of the Federal Power Commission, Joseph
C. Swidler, complained that complicated court rules on rate-making
valuation had made "rate regulation almost hopelessly cumbersome
and expensive. The expense of single rate cases has not infrequently
run into seven figures, and anywhere from a year to a decade or more
6. The frustration and futility which attended the interminable litigation in
these so-called "old-age" rate cases during the twenties and thirties, one of which
lasted fourteen years, found vigorous expression on the highest court. In his con-
curring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 73
(1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis ticks off a number of cases which had gone back
and forth between the courts and commissions. In McCart v. Indianapolis Water
Co., 302 U.S. 419, 435 (1938), Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, said: "This case is
an illustration of the almost insuperable obstacles to rate regulation today. It
involves a single company supplying water to a single community. It does not
present the difficulties of a far-flung utility system covering much territory with
many separate corporate creatures. Nevertheless, this particular case has already
consumed more than six years and is apparently destined to remain suspended for
six more years."
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE
may be required before commissions and courts have finally passed upon
them."'
These "old-age rate cases" were clearly the result of the traditional
judicial approach. This assumed that a utility rate case was just like
other cases before the court - essentially adversary proceedings such
as civil damage suits in which there had to be a plaintiff and a defendant
each striving for every possible advantage, technical or otherwise. Such
an approach also assumes that neither "side" shows any of its cards to
the other "side." Strict courtroom rules of evidence were employed.
The best lawyers (and best witnesses) had the best results. But the
overall public interest sometimes was lost in the shuffle.
The plain fact is that such rate cases are not truly adversary pro-
ceedings, and should not be made so, either by court trial practices or
formal commission procedures. The public utility rate case theoretically
does not have either proponents or opponents in the strict legal sense
of contesting parties. It may, and generally does, inspire differences
of opinion. These differences often require careful deliberation and
finely wrought decisions before they can be resolved by the regulatory
authorities. But it is nevertheless fundamental to the basic concept of
public utility regulation that the overall public interest is the prime
objective and the ultimate goal of every rate case.
It was, doubtless, in reaction to the overjudicialization of regula-
tion that an early concept of regulation by negotiation and informal
procedures has gathered strength since the late twenties. This move-
ment has received tremendous impetus through the introduction of
better and more uniform classifications of accounts, regular monthly
or other reliable periodic reports, continuous inventories, and other
businesslike disclosure procedures.
Under informal proceedings, commission and utility staff people
need not regard each other as enemies, to be told as little as possible
if even on speaking terms. The formal rate case, of course, must be
kept in reserve. It might be compared with the essential right to strike
in labor negotiations, always ready to be used when negotiations col-
lapse. Yet, under the new dispensation, the rate case can become simply
the occasional but less frequent difficult controversy, raising its head for
judicial inspection out of a constant stream of continuous adjustments
based on well-understood reporting and analytical techniques supported
by accepted principles.
James M. Landis, formerly President Kennedy's chief adviser on
regulatory matters, condemned the inordinate delay which character-
7. Swidler, The Uncertainties int the Legal Status of Temporary Rates, XII
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 136, 141 (Aug. 3, 1933).
SPRING 1963]
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss3/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
izes the disposition of adjudicating procedures before our regulatory
agencies as follows:
. . . The tendency here is again further to judicialize the admin-
istrative process and, in the opinion of many observers, to over-
judicialize it to a point where stagnation is likely to set in. More
recently a less legalistic approach has been taken; namely, to treat
the agency as more of a managerial mechanism so as to free it
in its broader aspects from the burdens entailed by judicial
requirements ...
. . . But if judgments of regulatory agencies in many fields such
as rates are, in truth, business judgments rather than judgments
conforming to a legal theory, techniques which do not rest upon
the tedious process of examination and cross-examination and
which underlie honest business judgments made by the industries
may have a value in the handling of substantially the same problem
by the agencies ... '
Prior to the Final Report of the Administrative Conference, it
received from its own committee on rule making an extensive report
which included the following recommendation on the encouragement
of settlements in rate cases:
Encouragement of settlement. The beneficial aspects of prompt
settlement of rate cases are obvious. The primary dangers involve
the possible sacrifice of the public interest in order to avoid formal
proceedings or to make a paper record of accomplishment. On
balance, the committee is impressed with the possibilities of the
use of settlement procedures in connection with rate filings and
suspensions, and urges that agencies make more extensive use of
this technique as a method of reducing the volume of formal actions
the agency must process as a result of suspensions. Of course, the
agency must make it perfectly clear to all interested persons that
if complaints are filed against rates accepted after settlement nego-
tiations, such complaints will be considered on their merits.9
This committee report also touched on the desirability of consulta-
tion with staff during the decisional stage and also the desirability of
blending the rule-making function with adjudication in the develop-
ment of rate policies."0 Some regulatory agencies - notably the SEC
- transfer the bulk of their work into the framing of generalized rules
so as to reduce litigation and promote informal procedures. Others -
notably the NLRB - prefer to "play it by ear," so to speak, avoiding
8. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., RgPORT ON
R.GULATORY AGENCIES TO TH4 PR5SID9NT-ELzcT 5, 7 (Comm. Print 1960).
9. COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVt CONFERENCE, IMPROVEMENT IN
THt CONDUCT OF FEDERAL RATE PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 2, 1962, page 22.
10. Id. at 54.
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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general rule making and tending to develop or improvise policy in the
process of deciding numerous contested cases.
The practice varies with other federal commissions, depending to
a large extent on governing statutes and the inherent characteristics of
the jurisdiction exercised. Thus, contested cases are rare before the
FCC but commonplace under the ICC. The FPC has so far followed
different methods with two different statutes it administers, the Federal
Power Act (under which there have been relatively few contested cases)
and the Natural Gas Act (under which the commission has been
forced into the uncomfortable position of the Old Woman Who Lived
in a Shoe).
A Tale of Two Commissions
Mere mention of the relative practices of the FPC and FCC
brings to mind a striking comparison of the formal case-by-case ap-
proach with the less formal system of constant surveillance based on
regular reports and conference adjustments. It is an impressive fact
that only twice, in its twenty-nine years of jurisdiction over interstate
long-distance telephone rates, has FCC had to resort to the initiation of
formal complaints; in both of those cases settlements by way of rate
reductions were made before the full-dress proceedings were completed.
During that period there were twenty-two interstate message rate re-
ductions (including the recent "after nine" $1 maximum country-wide
rate effective April 1, 1963) and only one general increase - all done
by informal conference proceedings."
11. The chairman of the FCC, Newton N. Minow, in a letter to Senator Pastore
(Democrat, Rhode Island) dated May 2, 1962, stated:
Whenever, in the judgment of the commission, it has appeared that overall
earnings were at a level to warrant rate reductions, the commission has generally
been successful in obtaining rate reductions that appeared warranted without
conducting protracted and costly hearings. By this means, the benefits of the
reductions are promptly made available to the public. Since 1935, there have
been a large number of reductions, with only one general increase in long-
distance telephone rates. The reductions have amounted to hundreds of millions
of dollars in annual savings to the public. The most recent - amounting to
some $50 million - became effective in September, 1959. It is noteworthy that
interstate long-distance telephone rates are 19 per cent lower than they were
in 1940. It is also noteworthy that all major interstate rate reductions were
the result of action initiated by the commission.
We think this record indicates that informality in procedure cannot be
equated with ineffectiveness in achieving results. Nor are informal procedures
necessarily less effective than the more time-consuming formal procedures. On
the contrary, as the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Elmer B.
Staats, stated in 1960, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, agencies
may use formal hearing processes in areas where "modern fact-gathering and
data-processing techniques would provide better information more quickly
and at less cost."
(Hearings, U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Communications, 87th Cong. 392. The
two formal proceedings commenced by the FCC were Docket No. 6053, June
5, 1941, and Docket No. 6468, Nov. 20, 1942.)
SPRING 1963]
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While this has been going on, a sister commission, the FPC, has
had to give up and throw in the sponge in attempting to fix natural
gas producer rates on a case-by-case formal hearings-findings-and-
opinion approach. The admission of former FPC Chairman Kuyken-
dall12 that it would take eighty-five years with a tripled staff to catch
up with its case load, plus the more recent aggressive approach by the
"Kennedy commission" under Chairman Swidler to break bottlenecks
through geographical area price fixing and settlement procedures, is
the best evidence that good and sound regulation can be achieved in
other ways than by starting out each case as if it were a mortal judicial
combat to be fought without quarter to the last appellate ditch if
necessary.
It should be added that the plight of the FPC in the producer rate
case debacle was not of its own choosing, but rather an unexpected
(and not entirely welcomed) inheritance from the majority opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in the Phillips decision of 1954.13
Since that frustrating peak of over 4,000 producer cases which
drew the attention of President Kennedy, 4 the FPC has struck out
boldly on a new course. By a combination of informal settlements of
key pipeline and producer cases and the more forthright approach of
fixing natural gas producer rates almost automatically, on the basis
of geographical area price standards, the present commission under the
leadership of Chairman Swidler appears to be making some headway
in its own "battle of the bulge."'" Not the least benefit of such informal
procedure was the speedy termination and final disposition of cases
which, once agreed upon, no longer continued to bounce around in the
appellate courts.'
Early Informal Rate Procedures
The technique for informal settlement of utility rate cases goes
back, however, before the activity of the federal commissions in this
field.17 It goes back to the state regulatory commissions in the twenties.
12. StNATe COMM. ON THE JuDICIARy, RIt'ORT ON RZ%ULATORY AGENcIEs To
THX PRXSIDtNT-ELEcT 6 (Comm. Print 1960).
13. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
14. Special message to Congress, 107 CONG. Rxc. 5519-5522 (daily ed., April
13, 1961).
15. In its annual report to Congress for 1962, the FPC noted that the pending
producer case load was down to 2,355, still a formidable backlog for any agency.
16. The 1962 annual report of the FPC observed that $380 million in
refunds to gas consumers were put into effect within eighteen months. It
stated: "Agreed upon refunds were made at once. New lower rates were put
into effect immediately, eliminating the time for decision and the possible delays
and uncertainties of litigation on appeals to the courts .. . and substantially all
settlements included moratoriums on future increases."
17. The Federal Communications Commission took jurisdiction over long-distance
telephone rates in 1934 (48 Stat. 1064. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1958)). The Federal Power
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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The secretary of the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, John
G. Hopwood, estimated that in that one state electric rates alone had
been reduced twenty-five million dollars between the years 1914 through
1928 through informal procedures. This is a much more impressive
sum when due consideration is given to the much greater purchasing
power of the dollar of that era and the relatively small volume of utility
operations compared with the present day. He added:
The sum of money saved to the public or all parties concerned
by these methods of co-operation in lieu of litigation amounts to
several hundred thousand dollars, but the benefits therefrom in
actual accomplishment cannot easily be estimated in dollars and
cents any more than can the benefits of peacetimes be compared on
the dollar and cent basis with times of war.'"
Another early witness to the efficacy of "regulation by negotiation"
was the former chairman of the District of Columbia Public Utilities
Commission, John W. Childress, who was able to point to electric rate
reductions averaging in the order of a half-million dollars per year
between 1926 and 1929 for the nation's capital city alone. He stated
in a magazine article, describing the mechanics of reviewing and
settlement used:
It seems to me that the attitude of understanding and com-
promise which has been the policy of the commission all along
has brought about a better feeling and an actual saving of money
to the people of the District of Columbia in the power company
case and the telephone case and bids fair to accomplish the same
in the near future where the transit lines are concerned. .... 1
As early as 1918 the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of
New Jersey permitted a street railway company to increase fares with-
out formal hearings, having been satisfied that the proposed rates were
just and reasonable.
Settlements and negotiations in the regulatory area, however, have
this much in common with settlements and negotiations in civil suits.
They must depend for successful results on the effectiveness of the
supporting data brought to the bargaining table. The very early efforts
of regulatory commissions along this line did not, admittedly, have the
Act, giving the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction over interstate electric rates,
dates from 1935 (49 Stat. 863, 16 U.S.C. § 825 (1958)). The Natural Gas Act was
approved in 1938.
18. Hopwood, Informal Complaints, III PUB. UTn.. FORT. 327, 329 (March 21,
1929).
19. Childress, Regulation by Negotiation, III PuB. UTIL. FORT. 693, 697 (June
13, 1929). The New Jersey streetcar fare increase noted was affirmed by the
New Jersey supreme court in O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility Com'r., 105 Atd.
132, 134 (1918).
SPRING 1963]
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advantage of systematic data, regularly accumulated and analyzed, that
has been provided under the Uniform Systems of Accounts and regular
monthly and other reports during the past two or three decades.
It is significant, however, that as early as 1936 the Federal Com-
munications Commission, in announcing a long-distance nation-wide
telephone rate reduction said that "Under the informal methods which
have been adopted the expected large savings to the public will become
available at once, rather than being delayed by hearings, arguments,
and possible litigation, as has been the situation in many rate proceed-
ings in the past."2 °
FCC Commissioner Rosel H. Hyde, more recently, 2' had occasion
to refer to the prior efforts of the FCC to build up an automatic and
systematic reporting and reviewing procedure designed for the very
purpose of checking on telephone company performance. Hyde stated:
One of the first projects of the newly created Federal Com-
munications Commission in 1934 was an investigation of the
telephone industry, which was a very broad investigation in
respect to all of its operations.
But, before it was concluded, the commission resorted to
negotiations in order to make immediately available the changes
in rates and regulations which the investigation indicated might
be appropriate. And, as a result of that investigation, the com-
mission adopted a policy, not an exclusive policy, but a pretty
general policy of trying to maintain a system of continuous regu-
lation that would keep abreast of changes from year to year rather
than have the commission resort to tremendous hearings which
could last several years and which could delay - or which could
end up at a time when the conditions which prompted the investi-
gation might not be current.
This does not mean that the FCC has surrendered or even laid
aside at any time its statutory right to institute formal proceedings
where the process of continuous surveillance does not produce satis-
factory results. On this subject, former FCC Chairman John C.
Doerfer said:
We shall, of course, continue our practice of maintaining a
continuing surveillance over these matters. You may rest assured
that the commission will promptly take appropriate action by
formal proceedings or otherwise as may be necessary should the
20. FCC Release 19117, December 2, 1936. FCC Chairman James Lawrence
Fly similarly stated in referring to another rate reduction: "I believe this is another
example of the constructive results which can be accoroplished when government and
industry sit around the conference table in an atmosphere of mutual respect and
good faith." (N.Y. Times, June 5, 1941.)
21. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing on Antitrust and Monopoly, 87th
Cong. 290 (April 6, 1962).
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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circumstances indicate that such action is required in order to
protect the interest of the public in just and reasonable telephone
rates.22
The same reservation behind the use of the instrument of formal
procedure was noted by the present FCC chairman, Newton N. Minow:
This is not to say that the commission is committed to a
policy of always refraining from the use of formal proceedings
in the regulation of interstate telephone service. The considera-
tions which bear upon the choice between formal and informal
proceedings are many and varied, and the only rule we have
followed is to adopt the procedure which seems to us best cal-
culated to protect the public interest in light of the circumstances
presented at any particular time. For example, on several oc-
casions where the use of our informal procedures was initially
unsuccessful in bringing about the results which the commission
sought to achieve, the commission instituted formal rate reduction
proceedings through the issuance of show-cause orders. In each
instance, this action led to a satisfactory resolution of the matter
without the need to proceed with the hearings.23
Legality of Informal Procedures
The question of whether utility rates must or should be fixed
after formal investigation may depend on whether hearings are actually
required by statute. Section 203(b) of the Communications Act of
1934 permits rate changes to become effective without hearings, after
notice. Sections 204 and 205 authorize, but do not require, hearings.
Nor is there any constitutional requirement that the public or the
users of the service be afforded a hearing since they do not have any
vested interest in fixed rates.24
It must be kept in mind that the consuming public still has the
protection of the regulatory commission itself. On the other hand, it
must be admitted that none of the statutes, federal or state, literally
provide for rate fixing by the informal process of constant surveillance
- that is to say, without the holdings of formal hearings. The wide-
spread use of such procedure, therefore, has grown and expanded on a
permissive basis. This is done under two alternative forms of statutory
controls. First, and by far the most numerous, are the laws of twenty-
22. Letter to Representative Emanuel Celler (Democrat, New York), June 24,
1958, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
23. Letter dated May 2, 1962, to Chairman John 0. Pastore (Democrat, Rhode
Island), Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Communication. Hearings
on Satellite Communications Legislation, 87 Cong. 392.
24. The most recent of many decisions oft this would appear to be Los Angeles
v. California Pub. Utilities Commission, 359 U.S. 119 (1959), where the state
commission had granted a telephone company rate relief without public hearings.
SPRING 1963]
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eight states25 which - like sections 203 and 204 of the federal Com-
munications Act - permit utility rate changes to be made, either
upward or downward, by the mere filing of revised schedules or
tariffs with the regulatory authorities in control.
In several other states," while no increase may be made except
upon a showing and finding by the commission that the increase is
justified, there is still no actual requirement that a hearing be held by
the commission. The California commission's refusal to hold hearings
under such circumstances was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court in a 1958 case.17 In Ohio, the commission is required to issue
a report on applications for rate changes and, if objections are made,
to set the case down for hearings. Even here, however, the commission
can and has given effect to agreements reached between the parties.28
In the remaining states, the statutes would either seem to require
hearings or have not been clearly construed in this regard.29 Whether,
of course, hearings and formal procedures are desirable, aside from the
legality of less formal methods, are always matters within the discretion
of the regulatory authority. As the United States Supreme Court said
in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,3" "the fixing
of 'just and reasonable' rates involves a balancing of the investor and
consumer interests." The real question, therefore, is whether that
balance can best be attained by formal proceedings or by other methods.
The Mechanics of Constant Surveillance
In mid-1938, the Federal Communications Commission announced
the results it had made of a study which indicated that the high degree
of integration in the telephone industry in the United States (the Bell
system, alone, doing ninety per cent of the business) demanded "the
erection of continuous regulatory machinery of great competency and
efficiency." This commission report specifically condemned "a purely
judicial attitude" and recommended the development of informal and
continuous methods:
Many of the problems of interstate telephone rate regulation
are continuing in nature, calling at all times for frank, informal
25. The author has checked the following state laws in this category: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
26. Arizona, California, Idaho, Kansas, Ohio, and Utah.
27. Los Angeles v. California Pub. Utilities Commission, 359 U.S. 119 (1959).
28. In Re Ohio Bell Teleph. Co., 27 P.U.R. 3d 66 (1958).
29. Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New
York, North and South Dakota. No rate jurisdiction exists in Iowa or Texas.
30. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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discussion between company and commission representatives. The
atmosphere of the council table seems ordinarily much more con-
ducive to the development of positive results in such matters than
does the adversary air which tends to surround most formal pro-
ceedings. The aspect of a game or contest which inevitably
envelopes the respective advocates (be they lawyers, accountants,
engineers, or what not) in formal rate cases makes for bickering
and bitterness, as well as for delay and expense.
If the essential factors can be soundly defined and weighted,
and if their factual background can be fully and frankly developed,
the positive and direct methods of informal negotiation should
prove effective, and desired ends should be attainable with a
minimum expenditure of time, money, and effort. Only through
some such concept of regulatory functions can an end apparently
be brought to the sorry spectacle of "ten-year rate cases." In rate
making, time is always of the essence," and certain of the state
commissions are today making notable progress in the development
of informal regulatory machinery.
Interstate telephone rates have grown up almost wholly out-
side the boundaries of regulation, and particularly careful scrutiny
of schedules and basic practices is therefore essential, in the public
interest. The very absence of a background of federal regulatory
experience renders basic factual development especially important.
Though informal methods are still on trial, and are to be judged
wholly from the standpoint of their practical results, there will
always be time for formal proceedings, if and when the more direct
and expeditious methods fail.32
Pursuant to this policy, the FCC and the Bell system3" have
worked out routines for the regular submission of reports. All Bell
system operating companies, including American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, comply with these arrangements.
Special reports are furnished to the FCC pursuant to rules and
regulations adopted and all Bell companies, of course, comply with the
Uniform System of Accounts prescribed by the commission. In addi-
tion, there are monthly, quarterly, and semiannual reports filed with
the FCC, which include comprehensive operating and financial informa-
tion. Special reports, as issued or at the time of occurrence, are like-
wise furnished along with all inter- and intrasystem publications,
technical or otherwise, news releases, etc. The whole picture adds up
to a gigantic expanding industrial operation performing in a "gold
fish bowl" of regulatory scrutiny.
31. Re Wisconsin Teleph. Co., 13 P.U.R. (n.s.) 224 (Wis. 1936).
32. FINAL REPORT OF THE TELEPHONE RATE AND RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 68
(June 15, 1958).
33. Some of the larger independent (non-Bell) telephone companies follow
similar routines.
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Continuous Surveillance in Action
With such a wealth of factual and statistical information constantly
flowing into FCC headquarters in Washington as well as to FCC field
offices in New York, St. Louis, and San Francisco, the commission
has at its disposal at all times a veritable fluoroscope of Bell telephone
system operating performance. The Common Carrier Bureau is thereby
enabled to review and make recommendations for commission action.
These are usually the prelude to a request for conferences with the
company officials. The agenda for those conferences is decided and
prepared, and in the final stages the full commission may sit to hear
the informal and uninhibited discussion by company spokesmen and
experts called in to explain the company's position under various topics
on the agenda. The Common Carrier Bureau of the commission staff
is, of course, present and participating.
Such conferences, therefore, are not to be confused with any star-
chamber proceedings or "deals" in smoke-filled rooms. On the contrary,
with the up-to-date "gold fish bowl" conditions under which present-
day utility companies must exist, there is far more disclosure, far more
room for give-and-take and for a real meeting of the minds than
under the traditional formal system of adversary parties playing their
cards as close to their vests as possible. These are entirely open pro-
ceedings to the extent of hearing facts and arguments from all inter-
ested parties which the commission feels have something useful to
contribute.
Perhaps better than any attempt of this writer to describe what
goes on at these hearings, a representative excerpt from the actual
transcript of a general meeting on long-distance rates before the FCC
on September 19 and 20, 1962, will give the reader a better idea of the
nature of these sessions. Present at this meeting were the full com-
mission, six members of the staff's Common Carrier Bureau, eleven
Bell system company officials, attorneys, and staff, and three outside
experts. The meeting had been set up as the result of a letter from
FCC Chairman Minow, dated July 25, 1962, calling attention to the
Commission's continuing evaluation of the system's level of earnings
and inviting the company to prepare a presentation for a subsequent
meeting.
An opinion or general statement of the company's position was
made by Edward B. Crosland, AT&T vice president, followed by
statements from three other vice presidents, the company's chief engi-
neer, treasurer, and revenue requirements chief - each dealing with his
own specialty. After each statement, there was interrogation by the
commission and staff.
[VOL. 8: p. 340
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Following the Bell System presentation, the Commission staff
engaged two independent consultants to study and present their views
on the considerations involved in determining the required earnings
for the interstate telephone operations. Their testimony was presented
on December 13, 1962 and Company witnesses presented rebuttal
testimony on January 4, 1963. As a result of these meetings, the FCC
announced that interstate station-to-station toll rates would be re-
duced to a maximum of $1.00 coast-to-coast after 9:00 p.m. This
reduction, offset in part by an increase in person-to-person rates which
had gotten out of line with increasing labor costs, resulted in a net
$30 million annual saving to the public.
Because this paper deals essentially with the informal surveillance
procedure itself, however, the flavor of this type of presentation might
best be exemplified by a statement and questions of one of the outside
experts, Harold Leventhal, Washington attorney and utility specialist,
who had made a statement to the commission on the efficacy of such
informal procedure. Following his direct presentation, Commissioner
Craven during the interrogation asked this question:
COMMISSIONER CRAVEN: . . . This goes to the matter of
procedures. As I see it we have two general courses of action
with respect to the procedures. One is a formal public hearing
to determine the reasonable rate of return - I am only talking
about rate of return - and the others are informal negotiations
or informal hearings such as this to determine whether rates
should be maintained or modified. Have you any preference, from
a legal standpoint, to either of these procedures and I want to call
it to your attention that the members of the Congress and others
have criticized the commission very severely for not engaging in
a formal public hearing in which there should be, as one of the
issues, the determination of a reasonable rate of return.
MR. LEVENTHAL: I would like to address myself to that
question in light of a more extended statement if I may, but I
will get to it, Commissioner. I don't suppose any serious student
of public administration has been other than concerned with the
whole problem of what to do with the problem of formal regula-
tory hearings. Reference was made yesterday [September 19,
1962] to the fact that among other things for one year I served
as Executive Officer of a Task Force of the Hoover Commission
which looked into operations of the regulatory commissions. And
we came then to certain conclusions. The task force report was
broader on this point than the final report of the Hoover Com-
mission, the problem of making them a more effective means of
regulation.
More recently of course [James M.] Landis has written a
very informative document on this subject in his report of Decem-
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ber, 1960. There have been studious hearings before a sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. There have of
course also been hearings in the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce. In my opinion there are such formidable
problems of running a rate hearing that if the central facts can
be obtained another way I think there are great advantages in
doing that. I don't mean for a moment to say that a commission
should act without hearings and investigations. On the contrary
I am on record in print as indicating that a large part of the
failure of commissions or certain aspects of the failures of com-
missions have been that they have adopted a passive approach to
a number of matters before them and taken up individual cases
as they came up like courts and have failed to develop general
approaches and form affirmative approaches to the public interest
and have also failed to carry on investigations where they should
be enlightening.
I am not against investigations. At the time we have two
excellent examples of investigation going on by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The investigation of the over-the-counter
market is still in the form of a staff investigation. The open
hearing phase has not begun. And to show the flexibility avail-
able, the commission had this analysis of the functioning of mutual
funds turned over to a study group. . . . So I think of the com-
mission as furthering an important element of public policy in
carrying on sophisticated investigations, perhaps not as dramatic as
the Congress itself can undertake. The seminal investigations of the
Federal Trade Commission back in the late 1920's and early
1930's which involved the public utility field were, of course, illu-
minating. So the commission does need information, but if a
process of informal approach - and I don't particularly, Mr.
Commissioner, say this is informal that we are having now. This
is on the record and-
THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead.
COMMISSIONER CRAVEN: No parties other than the company
and the commission are present.
MR. LEVENTHAL: Yes. The commissioners are present, the
staff is present, these are not cocktail party conferences. But a
less formal method of gathering facts seems to me to have enor-
mous advantages. The commission has to make the judgment at
the end of the road whether this approach is one that is getting
at the information that it needs. So far as the particular aspect
of a rate of return hearing is concerned this would tend to be a
more manageable kind of hearing than a full-dress rate regulatory
hearing, that is true. And indeed it is because of that that the
Federal Power Commission has been trying to break up some of
its regulatory proceedings and to offer as a separate segment the
rate of return aspect of it ....
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A reference was made during this presentation to the general
passenger fare investigation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which
dismissed a rate case in 1953"4 stating that, although there had been
no such proceeding in fourteen years of the board's existence, "Any
inference that the board is therefore uninformed with respect to rela-
tionships of fare and other significant economic aspects of the industry
is a gross non sequitur."
Ironically, however, the House Judiciary Antimonopoly Sub-
committee suggested thereafter that the CAB should institute a general
passenger fare investigation and it did so in May 1956.35 The case
went on for four and a half years. By the time of the decision, how-
ever, much of the testimony was hopelessly out of date and the economic
picture had changed so completely that not a single major airline in
the country was able to earn as much as the amount (10.5 per cent
return on investment) which the commission found to be fair and
reasonable for the industry as a whole.8 6 Developments during the lag
of formal proceedings had made the findings in the case virtually useless
and obsolete.
The Interstate Commerce Commission had a somewhat similar
experience in its formal reproduction cost valuation proceedings follow-
ing the O'Fallon decision by the United States Supreme Court in
1929."7 Only one of these nut-and-bolt-type valuations was even com-
pleted - that for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and it was out-of-date
before it was finished. Thereafter the commission abandoned such
proceedings.
Authoritative Commentary on Continuous Surveillance
As will be seen from the foregoing discussion, much of the virtue
of continuous surveillance lies in the flexibility of the process and the
lack of rigid restrictions which necessarily hedge about formal pro-
cedure. The commitment to precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis,
does not hang about the neck of the regulatory authority like an
34. General Passenger Fare Cases, C.A.B. (Docket E-7376, 1953).
35. C.A.B. Docket 8008, decided November, 1960. The criticism of informal
procedure by the FCC mentioned by Commissioner Craven also came from the
House Judiciary Committee's antimonopoly subcommittee, headed by Representative
Emanuel Celler (Democrat, New York). Mr. Celler, who is also chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, criticized the commission's regulation of the Bell system
in an address, "Monopoly Problems in Communications," before the 1962 convention
of the National Mobile Radio System, Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 18, 1962. The FCC's record in this respect was defended on the floor of the
Senate by Senator Pastore, 108 Cong. Rec. 15866 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1962).
36. Friedman and Friedman, The New Economics of the Air-line Industry,
68 PUB. UrnI. FORT. 230, 233 (Aug. 17, 1961).
37. St. Louis & O'Fallon R. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1929).
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albatross whenever suggestions are made to explore new avenues of
approach.
"Show me one case in which this has been done" is the frequent
challenge of counsel when a proposal is made to follow an unfamiliar
path. This is always a fair question in a formal proceeding under
traditional rules of evidence. But it is not the spirit in which Telstar
was launched. Dynamically expanding public services, such as our
own gas, electric, and telephone utilities, need all the room human
imagination can devise in weighing the impact of their performance on
our national economy. New methods, different formulae, alternative
standards, and shifting guide lines are all permissible within the dis-
cretionary ambit of the regulatory expertise when conference methods
are used. As Elmer B. Staats, of the Bureau of the Budget, told a
Senate Judiciary subcommittee on administrative practice and pro-
cedure:
There is evidence that formal hearing processes are used
where modern fact-gathering and data-processing techniques could
provide better information more quickly and at less cost. And this,
by the way, is one of the points which Judge Prettyman, I think,
pointed out as a task for the Conference on Administrative Pro-
cedure.
It has been suggested that the use of such techniques, in lieu
of excessive reliance on formal procedure, would better serve the
public interest, including especially the interests of the regulated
industries....
A primary objective of Congress when it created certain regu-
latory agencies was to permit the application of "expertise" - that
is, judgment informed by broad knowledge and experience. Yet
formal procedure makes it extremely difficult for hearing exam-
iners or even the commissions themselves to obtain the assistance
of staff experts in conducting hearings and reaching decisions on
the complex economic and social issues involved in certain kinds
of regulatory cases."
Furthermore, the conference method lends itself to a briefer, clearer
record uncluttered by extraneous exhibits and duplications of testimony.
Conferees bargaining in good faith are their own best "policemen of
the record" because they want to make the most effective and persuasive
impression in the shortest time for obvious reasons. Professor Kenneth
C. Davis of the University of Minnesota Law School tells of a "spec-
tacular" experience of the ICC in a railroad valuation which was
started with formal hearings - one which lasted 137 days without
38. Hearings, 87th Cong. 28, 29 (Nov. 29, 1960).
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getting anywhere. After formal hearings were disregarded, conference
methods were employed with "overwhelming success." He concluded:
The same commission that points with pride to such splendid
achievement also provides some of the outstanding examples of
procedural monstrosities. Some of the rule-making procedures
more nearly resemble the procedures of a murder case than sensi-
ble methods for determining subsidiary legislative policies. In a
case involving maximum hours for drivers of buses and trucks,
the carriers contended for twelve hours and the unions for ten
hours. Instead of trying to constitute itself a catalytic agent for
compromise, the ICC conducted formal adversary hearings in eight
or ten cities, took some 8,000 pages of testimony with hosts of
stupendous exhibits, required witnesses to swear to the truth of
comprehensive statistical compilations which they could not possi-
bly know of their own knowledge, and made a "decision." Other
agencies handle similar problems with ease and dispatch by
mediatory methods."9
Of course, the more recent use of so-called "canned testimony" in
formal regulatory proceedings has cut down the actual trial time a
great deal. This is done by publishing and distributing direct testimony
in advance of hearings. Indeed, it is doubtful if formal hearings in
complicated regulatory proceedings could be conducted these days with-
out "canned testimony." But it has its limitations. For one thing it
is often a product previously prepared, or "canned," by counsel; yet
a product which the actual witnesses are called upon to defend via
cross-examination. There is some truth in the rather facetious com-
ment that "canned testimony" is a system whereby the lawyers do the
testifying and the witnesses do the arguing. Then, too, there is the
temptation for counsel to dump everything into the printed record he
can lay his hands on, despite duplication or irrelevancy, since there is
little restriction except his own sense of restraint in the first instance.4
True, the examiner or hearing commissioner can toss out the excess
baggage on motion to strike. But this remedy is too often in the
nature of closing the barn door and places a lot of reliance on the
hearing officer's courage and initiative.
Some authorities on regulatory law are even shifting to the posi-
tion that conference methods may become mandatory if modern regu-
latory authorities are to keep pace with the demands of their public
service obligation. Dr. Mark S. Massel puts it this way:
39. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIrV LAW TRATIS5 (1958). Professor Davis devotes an
entire section (4.11) to the benefits of what he calls "informal adjudication."
40. The verbose burden of "canned testimony" on our long-suffering examiners
recalls the comment of the old-fashioned housewife who was asked what she did
with an excess fruit crop during canning season: "q can what I can," she said,
"and what I can't can, I can!"
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The rule-and-adjudication categories overlook a great bulk
of regulatory activities. Many, if not most, agencies must exercise
their functions mainly through negotiation and administrative
decisions. Those that are charged with promoting and expanding
the industries that they regulate must consider possible industry
reactions even when they make decisions that have judicial over-
tones.
There are reasonably persuasive indications that the work of
many agencies would bog down if informal negotiations were dis-
continued. Further, a requirement that all actions must fit into
the groove of rigid, formal procedures would cause unnecessary
harm to many individuals and companies. If the Federal Trade
Commission were compelled to discontinue its stipulation and
consent order procedures, it would have to forego a major part
of its activity. At the same time, the publicity and expense con-
nected with its formal proceedings would hurt many companies
that had innocently slipped into technical violations that have no
substantial competitive consequences.41
Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University says in his
report to the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure:
' * . even where formal proceedings are fully available, in-
formal procedures constitute the vast bulk of administrative ad-
judication and are truly the lifeblood of the administrative process.
No study of administrative procedure can be adequate if it fails
to recognize this fact and focus attention upon improvement at
these stages.42
The distinction between regulatory process and other controversies
in this respect was well stated by Justice Felix Frankfurter:
Since these agencies deal largely with the vindication of the
public interest and not the enforcement of private rights, this court
ought not to imply hampering restrictions, not imposed by Con-
gress, upon the effectiveness of the administrative process. One
reason for the expansion of the administrative agencies has been
the recognition that procedures appropriate for the adjudication
of private rights in the courts may be inappropriate for the kind
of determinations which administrative agencies are called upon
to make."
Results in Telephone Rate Making
The increasing complexity of both federal and state regulation in
the public utility field has shown the need for more flexible imaginative
41. The Regulatory Process, 26 LAW AND CONTFZMP. PROB., 181, 187 (1961).
42. REPORT, page 35, 1941.
43. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
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and resourceful determination of economic facts and conclusions in
gauging the performance of these vital public services.
Judging by results accomplished, the record of the FCC in relying
mainly on conference procedures to fix the nation's long-distance tele-
phone rate is a blue-ribbon exhibit. Interstate long-distance telephone
rates today are nineteen per cent lower than they were in 1940, even
though prices generally have more than doubled. Long haul calls have
benefited even more from rate reductions. For example, a weekday
station-to-station three-minute call between New York and San Fran-
cisco costs $2.25 today, compared with $6.40 in 1940. (Effective April
4, 1963, the station-to-station three-minute rate for calls between 9 P.M.
and 4:30 A.M. will be $1 maximum regardless of distances from coast
to coast.) During the period of FCC regulation there have been some
fifty negotiated changes in rates. While some of these have involved
increases, the net savings to the public from all of them total over
one billion dollars annually, based on 1962 volumes of business. In
addition, as a result of separations changes (i.e., reclassifying plant,
expenses, and revenues between intrastate and interstate business),
there have been equivalent reductions in intrastate revenue requirements
totalling more than $250 million annually, based on 1962 volumes of
business.
Despite an overall reduction in interstate rates and despite the
fact that intrastate rates have been increased far less than the cost of
living, the Bell system post-war growth rate of seven and one-half per
cent has been more than double that for the economy as a whole -
half again as much as the five per cent annual increase which many
regard as a necessary objective. In 1960, Bell system construction
expenditures were eight per cent of the total spent by all businesses, even
though its revenues were less than two per cent of the private portion
of the Gross National Product. Thus regulation by constant surveil-
lance has been in conformity with the policy of the Communications
Act.
Conclusion
Regulation of public utilities is a branch of administrative law
which has never stood still and never should. It has been growing and
shifting in concepts and methods ever since it emerged as a bundle of
loose principles and vague guide lines in the wake of the early Granger
decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth century." Despite its
admitted success in developing the best and most public service for the
people of the United States, as compared with government monopoly
44. Notably, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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services in most of the rest of the world, it has always been essentially
a pragmatic and evolutionary process. It did not spring full blown,
like Pallas Athena from the mind of Zeus. Instead, it was hammered
out in the crucible of trial and error and constant refinement.
Following the bare requirement, in Smyth v. Ames 4 in 1898, that
reasonable rates must be fixed on a fair base of property value devoted
to public service, regulation steadily evolved into a rough but workable
statutory pattern when the two pioneer state laws (New York and
Wisconsin) established public service commissions in 1907.
Regulation, as we know it today, did not reach its present stage
of practical operation without some false steps. Strewn along the way-
side of bygone years, we can look back and see the wreckage of many
once promising ideas, such as the Wisconsin indeterminate franchise46
or the Washington, D. C., plan for an automatic sliding scale, a profit-
sharing system of rate making. 4
The idea of a system of constant surveillance of utility performance
instead of formal procedure for rate making, however, is no untried
newcomer to the regulatory scene. As mentioned earlier in this article,
it started quietly in the late twenties and early thirties as a reaction
to so-called "old-age rate cases" which had been kicking around the
appellate courts for years, sometimes a decade or more, under more
formal procedures.
This, it is submitted, has been shown to be a valuable, modern,
regulatory tool increasingly compatible with the swift growth and com-
plicated economic patterns developed by the dynamic public utility indus-
try operations in the United States. Perhaps, the most valuable feature
of constant surveillance is its ready accommodation to the careful con-
sideration of new and varied techniques and standards for measuring
utility performance. Some of these may be here to stay. Some may be
tried and found wanting. The use of the controversial cost-of-money
test, based on earnings-to-price ratios of utility securities (to gauge
the allowable return) is a case in point. The use of comparisons of
earnings of other companies and industries in making the return allow-
ance is another example.
These and other more traditional factors can all be weighed more
seriously and deliberately at the conference table than within the rigid
format of formal proceedings, and rules of pleading and evidence. The
guiding principles of regulation might well be viewed as a supporting
trellis on which more than one theoretical vine can blossom at the same
45. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
46. Superior Water, Light & P. Co. v. Superior, 263 U.S. 125 (1923).
47. Successful for a quarter of a century, but finally abandoned under pressure
of postwar inflation. Re Potomac Electric Co., 8 P.U.R. 3d 76 (1955).
[VOL. 8: p. 340
21
Welch: Constant Surveillance: A Modern Regulatory Tool
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE
time. The United States Supreme Court certainly recognized this
sixty-five years ago when it offered a choice of seven criteria in deter-
mining fair value for rate making in the Smyth v. Ames decision.
Subsequent experience eventually showed that only two of these -
orginal cost and present fair value - were of general or lasting
practical use. But the highest court in 1898 was obviously not even
trying to lay down any restrictive formula. On the contrary, it seemed
to encourage alternative paths to the same goal.
And so, in subsequent years, the regulatory commissions have
availed themselves of alternative methods to test and double check
different findings and theories. It follows that they can do this more
freely and effectively when they are not hampered in their deliberations
by procedural restrictions of commitments to formal precedent. With
the much greater reliance and responsibility placed by the United States
Supreme Court on the so-called "expertise" of the regulatory com-
missions, 48 the availability of more precise and useful instruments of
disclosure and negotiation becomes most essential for the regulatory
authorities. Furthermore, as already noted in this article, constant
surveillance does not surrender the ultimate recourse to formal pro-
cedures, when conference methods fail to reach satisfactory results.
There will always be rate cases; and in times of volatile inflation
there are likely to be more rather than less. This is mainly because
some of the early regulatory statutes were mechanically geared to a
formal sequence of filed tariffs, suspensions, and thereafter a mandatory
period of investigation and findings. In most instances, however,
regulatory commissions, both state and federal, are not hamstrung nor
condemned by the strict letter of their laws to formal protracted rate
proceedings in each case involving a general rate change.
48. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 315
U.S. 575 (1942); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591(1944).
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